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INVENTORS BEWARE: THE DANGER OF GETTING
TOO MANY PATENTS
Daniel Kazhdan & Molly R. Silfen*
Until recently, conventional wisdom held that getting more patents
was all upside (aside from the cost of prosecution and maintenance).
Later patents—even if of questionable validity—could not hurt your existing portfolio, and, so long as you did not assert your weak patents,
they would just sit quietly collecting dust. That conventional wisdom
was pretty much true.
Conventional wisdom has not changed, but the reality has. Because
of three recent developments, getting continuation patents can now affirmatively hurt your whole portfolio—even patents you already have.
First, with the 2011 passage of the America Invents Act, the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office adopted a strong form of estoppel for post-issuance proceedings. That estoppel means that, once someone petitions the
agency for post-issuance review of a patent, the patent owner may have
no way of avoiding an estoppel-creating judgment on the validity of the
patent—one that will potentially infect the owner’s other patents. Second, courts have long allowed a patent owner to show that her patent
would not have been obvious by pointing to various so-called objective
indicia (such as the commercial success) of a patented product. For that
evidence to be meaningful, though, there needs to be a nexus between
the patent claims and the product. Recently, the Federal Circuit ruled
that if the inventor has other patents that claim other, different features
of the product, those other patents make it harder to show nexus. Thus,
getting additional patents might, once again, weaken existing patents.
Third, in 2014, the Federal Circuit changed the law of double patenting
and ruled that later-issued patents could shorten the patent-term adjustment of earlier-issued patents. Therefore, a patent could lose a few
years of term simply because the patent owner got a continuation patent.
Following these changes, patent owners should be more judicious
when they consider applying for additional patents because their later
applications can potentially damage their whole portfolio.
* Daniel Kazhdan and Molly R. Silfen are Associate Solicitors at the United States
Patent and Trademark Office. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of
the authors and do not reflect the views or opinions of the United States Patent and Trademark
Office.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A common refrain is, “More is always better.”1 As applied to patents, this means collect more patents.2 After all, other than the cost of
getting the patents (which, to be sure, is a real cost), more patents means
more IP protection. Right? Indeed, some have argued that, “for patents,
the whole” of a patent portfolio consisting of multiple patents “is greater
than the sum of its parts.”3 In the past, that was pretty much true. Aside
from a few exceptional cases, obtaining additional patents could not hurt
your pre-existing portfolio.
As this article shows, that is not true anymore. After providing
some background on patent prosecution in Section I, this article demonstrates that three recent legal changes have made it so that getting more
patents can affirmatively hurt a portfolio—even hurting patents that
were already issued. Section II analyzes the most significant change,
which comes from how the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has implemented the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011 (the “AIA”). 4
Both before and after the AIA, parties could challenge issued patents in
the Patent and Trademark Office. Before the AIA, there were ex parte
and inter partes reexaminations.5 The AIA left ex parte reexaminations6
but replaced inter partes reexaminations with three more trial-like proceedings.7 In implementing the AIA, the Patent and Trademark Office
promulgated regulations that make it more difficult for patent owners to
avoid agency trials without an adverse judgment. Where patent owners
could get out of reexaminations without an estoppel-creating decision
by simply disclaiming all the challenged claims,8 AIA trials have no similar exit ramp. Like the pre-AIA reexaminations, if the agency ultimately
gets to the merits, then that decision can create a binding estoppel.9 AIA
1. Mean Girls on Broadway, “More Is Better” | Mean Girls on Broadway, YOUTUBE
(May 17, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3BEj3HyJQGU.
2. But see Christopher J. Rourke, Key Strategic Considerations in Obtaining Domestic
and International Patents in DEVELOPING A PATENT STRATEGY (2013), Westlaw 2013 WL
571775, at *12 (explaining why failing to focus on the commercial value of individual patents
in a portfolio can result in high maintenance costs with little financial gain).
3. Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PENN. L. REV.
1, 5 (2005) (emphasis added); see also Rourke, supra note 2, at *12.
4. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284-341 (2011)
[hereinafter AIA].
5. 35 U.S.C. §§ 302-307 (2006) (ex parte reexamination); id. at §§ 311-318 (inter partes
reexamination).
6. See id. at §§ 302-307.
7. See id. at §§ 311-319 (inter partes review), §§ 321-329 (post-grant review); AIA, 125
Stat. at 329-31 (covered business method review).
8. See MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE (“MPEP”) § 706.03(w) (U.S.
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 8th ed. rev. 8, July 2010).
9. See id.
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trials are novel, though, because the implementing regulations leave the
patent owner with no simple way out: if the patent owner disclaims her
claims or abandons the proceedings, the Board may enter an adverse
judgment with binding estoppel effects.10
Section III discusses the recent shift in the law of nexus. If a patent
is challenged as obvious, the patent owner has long been able to point to
secondary considerations, like the “commercial success” of a claimed
product, as evidence that the claims would not have been obvious.11
However, secondary considerations are probative of non-obviousness
only if there is a “nexus” between the product and the claimed features:
If, for example, a product is commercially successful due to something
other than the claimed invention, commercial success is irrelevant.12 Unfortunately, “there is rarely a perfect correspondence” between patent
claims and a commercial product, so it can be difficult to tell whether
secondary considerations like commercial success are due to the patented invention.13 A particularly difficult nexus question arises when
multiple patents cover various aspects of a single product.14 In a recent
case, the Federal Circuit held that the default is that having multiple patents that cover the same product cuts against nexus (in a rebuttable way)
unless the different patents cover “essentially the same invention.”15
Section IV considers recent changes to the law of obviousness-type
double patenting. Historically, a parent application could not lose its
patent term based on a later-issued continuation application. Not anymore.16 Now, a later-filed, later-issued patent might shorten the term of
its parent.17
Finally, Section V notes a few long-existing doctrines under which
an inventor’s later patents have always created potential risks to earlier
10. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.73 (2020).
11. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966); see also Consol. Safety Valve
Co. v. Crosby Steam Gauge & Valve Co., 113 U.S. 157, 179 (1885) (making an invention
“practically valuable” is evidence of non-obviousness).
12. Fox Factory, Inc. v. SRAM, LLC, 944 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019); In re
Caveney, 386 F.2d 917, 923 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
13. Fox Factory, 944 F.3d at 1374.
14. See DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 5.05[2][f], at 5-1073-77 (2019) (citing cases).
15. Fox Factory, 944 F.3d at 1377, 1378; see also Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson
& Co., 593 F.3d 1289, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (finding no presumption of nexus where there
was “uncontroverted evidence” demonstrating that the product succeeded because of features
already present in prior art), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 374 F. App’x 35 (Fed.
Cir. 2010), reinstated in relevant part, 649 F.3d 1276, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
16. See Abbvie Inc. v. Kennedy Inst. of Rheumatology, 764 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2014);
Gilead Scis., Inc. v. Natco Pharma Ltd., 753 F.3d 1208 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
17. See Daniel Kazhdan, Obviousness-Type Double Patenting: Why it Exists and When
It Applies, 53 AKRON L. REV. (forthcoming June 2019).
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patents: inequitable conduct, prosecution laches, claim construction, and
prosecution history estoppel. However, as the section describes, these
can be avoided through careful prosecution.
The upshot is that inventors should be careful before they seek more
and more patent protection. Those extra patents can sometimes affirmatively hurt the value of a patent portfolio.
II. HOW PATENTS ARE PROSECUTED
Patent prosecution is an intricate area of practice,18 but, for our purposes, only a high-level understanding of a few basic points is necessary.19 The process starts when an inventor files an application with the
Patent and Trademark Office. There are two kinds of patent applications: provisional applications and nonprovisional applications. Only
nonprovisional applications are relevant for this article.
An inventor who files a nonprovisional application must include
both a “specification,” which describes and enables the invention, and
claims, which particularly and distinctly claim the invention.20 Every
application receives an effective “filing date.”21 The effective filing date
is important for several reasons, notably: (1) it defines the prior art that
can be raised against the patent (prior art has to be prior to the effective
filing date)22 and, since 1995, (2) the patent expires 20 years after that
date.23
An inventor can, if she so chooses, file for multiple patents on the
same or similar inventions. There are two ways to do this.
A. Unrelated applications
Inventors can file multiple “unrelated” applications: the different
applications might not even mention one another. This method of filing
for patents can create problems for the inventor’s later-filed applications
depending on certain intricacies of timing.24
B. Related applications
The inventor can also file “related” applications, where the later applications reference and claim certain benefits from the earlier—
18. See generally MPEP.
19. Portions of this section are copied from Kazhdan, supra note 17.
20. 35 U.S.C. §§ 111(a)(2)(A), 112(b) (2012); MPEP § 601 (9th ed. rev. 08.2017, Jan.
2018).
21. 35 U.S.C. § 111(a)(4) (2012).
22. Id. at § 103; see MPEP § 2141.
23. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (Supp. V 2017).
24. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2012) (providing that an inventor cannot get a patent if,
for example, the invention was first described in another patent).
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sometimes called the “parent”—application.25 There are three types of
related applications: (1) continuation applications, (2) divisional applications, and (3) continuation-in-part applications.26 In all three, the inventor must apply for the “child” application before the parent issues.27
In continuation and divisional applications, the inventor files for multiple patents using largely the same specification,28 and the inventor can
claim the filing date of the parent. In a continuation-in-part application,
an inventor can add new matter to the specification, but the claims of the
continuation-in-part application get the benefit of the parent’s filing date
only if the parent application contains a disclosure that supports those
claims.29
There are many reasons an inventor might choose to file multiple
related applications on the same invention. The Patent and Trademark
Office might insist on the inventor dividing her claims,30 the inventor
might worry that prosecuting all the claims right away would be too expensive, the inventor might believe that prosecuting the more-ambitious
claims could hold up the issuance of the less-ambitious ones, the inventor could be trying to game the system, or the inventor might have some
other reason.31
III. THE REGULATIONS THAT IMPLEMENT THE AMERICA INVENTS ACT
HAVE MADE IT EASIER FOR A PETITIONER TO USE ONE WEAK PATENT AS
A LEVER TO CHALLENGE OTHER PATENTS
With this background in hand, we can now consider the recent
changes to patent law. The AIA made several significant changes to
patent law. One was the establishment of AIA trials through which petitioners can aggressively challenge issued patents at the Patent and
Trademark Office. Importantly, petitioners choose which patent to target, so they can start by attacking the weakest one. As this section
shows, that ability can be an incredibly powerful tool for taking down a
whole patent portfolio—not just the weak patents.

25. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 120–121, 154(a)(2).
26. MPEP § 201.02 (9th ed. rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018).
27. 35 U.S.C. § 120.
28. Id. §§ 201.06, 201.07.
29. See MPEP § 201.08 (9th ed. rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018).
30. 35 U.S.C. § 121.
31. See Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations,
84 B.U. L. REV. 63, 65 (2004) (listing some “pernicious” reasons); see id. at 74-83 (expanding
on these reasons); id. at 68 (giving less pernicious reasons).
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A. Controlling the battleground
A petitioner that manages to invalidate one patent in a portfolio gets
both de facto and de jure benefits when it later challenges other patents
in the portfolio.
1. Atmospherics
“Specific patterns of timing and sequence matter.”32 Experienced
litigators know this, and they are thoughtful in choosing the sequence in
which they present their cases. Perhaps the best-known example is the
way Thurgood Marshall and the NAACP (National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People) carefully chose the order of cases in
which to challenge Plessy’s “separate but equal” standard.33 They
started by attacking segregation in law schools, moved to graduate
schools more generally, and, only after they had won those cases, went
down the educational ladder to public schools.34 As Oona Hathaway
notes, this was a classic example of “path dependence”: they “present[ed] cases in an order that maximized their chances of obtaining the
legal standard they sought.”35
Applying this strategy to the patent context, patent owners should
try to litigate their strongest patent first, while patent challengers should
try and start with the weakest one. The party that defines the battleground has a major advantage because it is “strikingly prevalent” for
courts to follow the result in an earlier patent decision even when they
are not formally bound to do so.36 Thus, if claims in one patent in a
family are deemed valid in one tribunal, a later tribunal will likely find
that to be a meaningful consideration in considering claims in a related
patent. The converse is also true: if claims in one patent are found to be
invalid, a later court is likely to find that claims in a related patent are,
too.
32. Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics, 94
AM. POL. S CI. REV. 251, 251 (2000).
33. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
34. See, e.g., Constance B. Motley, The Historical Setting of Brown and its Impact on
the Supreme Court’s Decision, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 9, 11-14 (1992) (citing cases); Wiley A.
Branton, The Effects of Brown v. Board of Education: A Retrospective View, 23 HOW. L.J.
125, 129-31 (1980) (similar).
35. Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal
Change in A Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 650 (2001).
36. Anthony M. Garza, Collateral Estoppel and Claim Construction Orders: Finality
Problems and Vacatur Solutions, 6 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 4 (2005); see id. at 4
n.11 (citing cases); cf. Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638, 642 (1936) (finding that, even where
an earlier decision is not “res adjudicata,” it may, “by comity[,] be given great weight in a
later litigation and thus persuade the court to render a like decree”), overruled in part by
Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Illinois Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
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The Supreme Court’s decision in Providence Rubber Co. v. Goodyear37 makes this point almost explicitly. The Goodyears made a lot of
money enforcing their patent on rubber—in each case, they were successful.38 When they sued Providence Rubber Co., Providence Rubber
alleged that Goodyear was not the first inventor of rubber.39 The Supreme Court began by noting that, despite the “numerous cases of litigation” that were “earnestly contested,” the Goodyear patent was sustained
“in every instance.”40 The Supreme Court found this “very persuasive”
evidence that Goodyear was the first inventor—indeed, the presumption
was “impregnable.”41 If the patent was invalid, the Supreme Court could
not “doubt that it would have been overthrown in the numerous and severe assaults which have been made upon it.”42 The Supreme Court then
reviewed the evidence just to be sure—and it remained convinced that
Goodyear was the first inventor.43
A more recent example is Idenix, where both the district court and
the Federal Circuit ruled that Idenix’s patent did not enable its claim to
a specific geometry of a compound. 44 In their analyses, both courts
found it noteworthy that a prior Federal Circuit decision, Storer, had invalidated a different Idenix patent for failing to enable the compound.45
No one disputed that Storer was distinguishable from Idenix: As the district court recognized, it “involved a different patent, having different
claims as well as a different specification . . . , the evidentiary record [in
Idenix was] far more developed than [in Storer], and the legal standard
applicable [in Idenix] . . . [wa]s far more favorable to Idenix than it was
[in Storer].”46 Yet both Idenix decisions mentioned Storer because both
thought it significant that a prior tribunal had invalidated somewhat similar patent claims.47

37. 76 U.S. 788, 793-94 (1869).
38. Id. at 793.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 793.
41. Id. at 793-94.
42. Id. at 794.
43. Goodyear, 76 U.S. at 794.
44. Idenix Pharm. LLC v. Gilead Scis., Inc., No. CV 14-846, 2018 WL 922125 (D. Del.
Feb. 16, 2018), aff’d in relevant part, 941 F.3d 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
45. Idenix, 941 F.3d at 1155 n.1. (citing Storer v. Clark, 860 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).
46. Idenix, 2018 WL 922125, at *18 n.17; see also Idenix, 941 F.3d at 1155 n.1.
47. Of course, this is not a fixed rule, and courts will sometimes not even begin analogizing related patents because they involve “different patents, different specifications, or different claims.” Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1084, 1095 (Fed. Cir. 2019);
see Shelcore, Inc. v. Durham Indus., Inc., 745 F.2d 621, 627 (Fed.Cir.1984).
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2. Res judicata
When certain conditions are met, path dependence is enshrined in
the doctrine of res judicata—either claim preclusion or issue preclusion.48 As the Supreme Court has explained, if there is a “final judgment,” then claim preclusion “forecloses ‘successive litigation of the
very same claim, whether or not relitigation of the claim raises the same
issues as the earlier suit.’ ” 49 Meanwhile, issue preclusion “bars ‘successive litigation of an issue of fact or law actually litigated and resolved
in a valid court determination essential to the prior judgment,’ even if
the issue recurs in the context of a different claim.”50 Decisions by administrative agencies create res judicata just as much as decisions by
district courts—unless a statute expressly provides otherwise.51
Although res judicata certainly applies to patent law, patents are
something of an awkward fit. At the threshold, while a patent owner can
assert the same patent against many different parties, each particular patent litigation generally involves only two parties—the patent owner and
one defendant. For a long time, the Supreme Court held that a patent
owner whose patent was found invalid against one defendant could still
assert it against another.52 However, in 1971, the Supreme Court in
Blonder-Tongue abrogated its prior precedent and ruled that a new defendant could raise estoppel as a defense against a patent that had been
previously invalidated by another party.53
Technically, the Supreme Court left the patent owner some room to
navigate around estoppel. Before a court could find estoppel, “the patentee-plaintiff must be permitted to demonstrate, if he can, that he did
not have ‘a fair opportunity procedurally, substantively and evidentially
to pursue his claim the first time.’ ” 54 The Supreme Court suggested
some half dozen factors that might cut against a finding of estoppel:
“choice of forum”; “incentive to litigate”; “whether the first validity determination purported to employ the [proper legal] standards”; whether
the decision in the first case indicates that “the courts wholly failed to
grasp the technical subject matter and issues in suit”; and “whether without fault of his own the patentee was deprived of crucial evidence or
48. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008).
49. Id. (quoting New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 748 (2001)).
50. Id. (quoting New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 748-49); see also B & B Hardware, Inc. v.
Hargis Indus., 575 U.S. 138, 148 (2015).
51. See B & B, 575 U.S. at 148; Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S.
104, 107-08 (1991).
52. Triplett, 297 U.S. at 642.
53. Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 350.
54. Id. at 333 (quoting Eisel v. Columbia Packing Co., 181 F. Supp. 298, 301 (Mass.
1960)).

298

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:60

witnesses in the first litigation.”55 Notwithstanding this multi-factor
analysis, courts are quick to apply estoppel once an earlier tribunal invalidates a patent. Nearly every court to rule on the issue has found that
a first judgment of invalidity estops the patent owner in later cases.56
And, over a dissent, the Federal Circuit has recently refused to even wait
for briefing on the estoppel issue.57 The few exceptions prove the rule:
There was a case in 1975 where an Ohio court allowed a patent owner
to relitigate the enforceability of a patent that the Seventh Circuit had
previously deemed unenforceable.58 Still, the court found the patent unenforceable based on the “authority” of the Seventh Circuit case.59 There
was also a Federal Circuit case that suggested, without deciding, that it
might be “possible” for a patent owner who settled after losing a first
case to avoid estoppel in a later case.60 Those two cases are the closest
courts have come to not applying estoppel.
The bigger problem with applying res judicata to patent cases is
how to decide when two cases present the same “claim” or “issue.”61
This is far murkier. At least some decisions suggest that everything (the
claims and the record) must be the same. Thus, the Federal Circuit like
its predecessor, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, sometimes
allowed an inventor whose patent was invalidated in court to prosecute
identical claims in a continuation application simply by filing a new affidavit.62 The most famous advocate of this narrow approach to estoppel
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Soverain Software LLC v. Victoria’s Secret, 778 F.3d 1311, 1315 (Fed.
Cir. 2015); Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2013);
Restorative Care of Am. Inc. v. Dickinson, 232 F.3d 909 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Table); Pharmacia
& Upjohn Co. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 170 F.3d 1373, 1379-80 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Mendenhall
v. Barber-Greene Co., 26 F.3d 1573, 1577-78 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Mississippi Chem. Corp. v.
Swift Agr. Chemicals Corp., 717 F.2d 1374, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Kaiser Indus. Corp. v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 515 F.2d 964, 987 (3d Cir. 1975), amended, 524 F.2d 1154 (3d
Cir. 1975); Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Kawneer Co., 482 F.2d 542, 549 (5th Cir. 1973).
57. XY, LLC v. Trans Ova Genetics, 890 F.3d 1282, 1294-95 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (over a
dissent by Judge Newman).
58. See Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Cincinnati Milacron, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 1040, 1068
(S.D. Ohio 1975), aff’d, 562 F.2d 365 (6th Cir. 1977).
59. Id.
60. See Aqua Marine Supply v. AIM Machining, Inc., 247 F.3d 1216, 1221 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (“In a future action, it is possible that Aqua Marine could avoid collateral estoppel by
arguing that it did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of invalidity.”); cf.
Hall v. U. S. Fiber & Plastics Corp., 476 F.2d 418, 420-21 (3d Cir. 1973) (refusing to opine
on the question of estoppel).
61. See In re Freeman, 30 F.3d 1459, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“Difficulty sometimes
arises, however, in delineating the issue on which litigation is, or is not, foreclosed.”).
62. See In re Donohue, 766 F.2d 531, 533 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (finding that an applicant’s
new affidavit creates a “new record [that] presents a new issue”); In re Russell, 439 F.2d 1228,
1230 (C.C.P.A. 1971); In re Craig, 411 F.2d 1333, 1334 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (overruling prior
precedent to the contrary).
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was Justice Clark. Sitting by designation on the Seventh Circuit (after
he retired from the Supreme Court),63 Justice Clark ruled that a patent
owner was estopped from asserting only “explicitly” invalidated claims,
but the patent owner could still assert similar claims.64 Most courts,
however, are far more willing to find estoppel,65 and the Federal Circuit—like the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals—regularly applies
res judicata even when there are new claims or new evidence.66 At present, the Federal Circuit seems to be willing to apply res judicata whenever the asserted patent “describe[s] substantially the same invention” as
the invalidated patent.67
Whatever clarity there may have been was upended by the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Gunn v. Minton,68 which seems to send res
judicata back a half century. In Gunn, the Court addressed the question
of whether a patent-law malpractice claim must be brought in federal
court.69 As the Gunn Court noted, legal malpractice is a state-law cause
of action, so malpractice cases normally go to state court.70 However,
by statute, state courts have no “jurisdiction [over any claim for relief]
arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents,”71 which might
suggest that patent-malpractice cases should be decided in federal court.
In Gunn, the Supreme Court ruled that patent-malpractice cases do not
have to be litigated in federal courts because they do not present a “significant” question that affects the “federal system as a whole.”72 One
potential issue was that the state court’s decision might be res judicata
on federal courts for related patents, but the Supreme Court was unconcerned. 73 It questioned whether state-court decisions could create

63. See generally MIMI CLARK GRONLUND, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE TOM C. CLARK:
A LIFE OF SERVICE (2010).
64. Bourns, Inc. v. Allen-Bradley Co., 480 F.2d 123, 124, 126 (7th Cir. 1973).
65. Bourns, Inc. v. United States, 537 F.2d 486, 492 (Ct. Cl. 1976); Westwood Chem.,
Inc. v. Molded Fiber Glass Body Co., 498 F.2d 1115, 1117-18 (6th Cir. 1974) (citing Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode Elecs., Inc., 484 F.2d 905, 908-09 (7th Cir. 1973)).
66. See MPEP § 706.03(w) (citing In re Freeman, 30 F.3d 1459 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Edgerton v. Kingland, 168 F. 2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1947); In re Szwarc, 319 F.2d 277 (C.C.P.A. 1963);
In re Katz, 467 F.2d 939 (C.C.P.A. 1970)).
67. Ohio Willow Wood Co. v. Alps South, LLC, 735 F.3d 1333, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2013);
see also MaxLinear, Inc. v. CF CRESPE LLC, 880 F.3d 1373, 1377-78 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (requiring the Board on remand to consider “whether the remaining claims present materially
different issues that alter the question of patentability”); Univ. of Minn. v. LSI Corp., 926
F.3d 1327, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (additional views of the panel).
68. 568 U.S. 251 (2013).
69. Id. at 253.
70. Id. at 258.
71. 28 U.S.C. § 1338.
72. See Gunn, 568 U.S. at 263-65.
73. Id. at 262-63.
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estoppel in a patent case at all.74 Regardless, it held that any estoppel
“would be limited to the parties and patents that had been before the state
court.”75
Everything about this is surprising. Although not our issue, the Supreme Court’s skepticism about estoppel from state court to federal court
seems to overlook the Full Faith and Credit Act, which requires federal
courts to give state court decisions the same preclusive effects as the
state’s courts would.76 If the state-court decision would create estoppel
in state court, then it should create estoppel in federal court, too. The
Supreme Court’s suggestion that estoppel is limited to the “patents” involved in the first litigation, albeit in accord with Justice Clark, is inconsistent with most courts. And the Court’s statement that any preclusion
would be limited to the specific “parties” litigating the malpractice suit
is irreconcilable with Blonder-Tongue.77

*

*

*

*

*

Ultimately, the application of res judicata to patent cases remains
remarkably complicated. Correspondingly, the Manual for Patent Examining Procedure recommends that examiners include other rejections
along with any res judicata rejection.78 But, whether because of atmospherics or because of res judicata, once one patent claim falls, there is a
risk of “[a] domino approach in which each successively narrower claim
is compared with the one before it,” and a whole portfolio can come
apart.79 Thus, the effects of path dependence can significantly reduce
the value of a patent portfolio.
B. Before the America Invents Act, a patent owner could largely keep
tribunals from ruling on non-asserted patents
With a few exceptions, before the AIA a patent owner could make
sure no tribunal issued an estoppel-creating judgment on her weakest

74. See id. at 263.
75. Id.
76. 28 U.S.C. § 1738; see also Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980) (“Congress has
specifically required all federal courts to give preclusive effect to state-court judgments whenever the courts of the State from which the judgments emerged would do so.”).
77. Perhaps to avoid this problem, Professor Gugliuzza reads the Court’s statement as
just a careless way of getting at the point that a state court’s rulings about a specific case are
not likely to have broad implications over the state of patent law. See Paul Gugliuzza, Rising
Confusion About “Arising Under” Jurisdiction in Patent Cases, 69 EMERY L.J. 459, 477
(2019). As Gugliuzza recognizes, though, many Federal Circuit judges read Gunn differently
than he proposes. See id. at 478-85 (citing cases).
78. See MPEP § 706.03(w).
79. See Bourns, 537 F.2d at 493 (criticizing this as “inappropriate”); In re Lundberg, 280
F.2d 865, 867 (C.C.P.A. 1960) (ruling that this is proper); see generally CHISUM, supra note
14, § 11.03[5][d] (noting that courts are split on the issue).
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patents. There were three primary ways that a non-asserted patent could
be dragged into litigation: (i) interferences, (ii) reexaminations, and
(iii) declaratory judgments. However, all three were of limited effect.
1. Interferences created significant estoppel but were rare
Before the AIA, the United States granted patents to the first person
to invent something.80 As a result, if two people applied for patents on
essentially the same invention, the Patent and Trademark Office needed
to decide who came up with the invention first. These disputes were
resolved in a proceeding called an “interference,” and interferences have
been around since 1793.81 Initially, interferences went to an arbitration
panel,82 but later, Congress created a special board within the Patent and
Trademark Office—today called the Patent Trial and Appeal Board83—
that was tasked with resolving interferences.84 Although interferences
were fundamentally about who invented first, once the Office declared
an interference, the Board could decide any question of “patentability.”85
Board interference decisions came with significant estoppel effects.
At least by regulation (and maybe even by res judicata), Board judgments disposed of “all” issues that were or “could have properly been”
raised and decided in the interference. 86 Moreover, once the Patent and
Trademark Office declared an interference (assuming it did not later reconsider that decision), there was no avoiding a final judgment. If the
parties litigated the interference to a final Board decision on the merits,
the decision would, naturally, create estoppel.87 But a party could not
avoid estoppel by withdrawing from the interference: a request to withdraw was treated as a “[r]equest for adverse judgment”88 that precluded
80. Thus the pre-AIA Patent Act had a complicated interference process to determine
“priority of the invention[],” which has since been abolished. See 35 U.S.C. § 135(a) (2006);
Storer v. Clark, 860 F.3d 1340, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (The AIA “abolished the first-to-invent
interference rule in favor of a first-to-file rule.”).
81. See 1 Stat. 318, 322-23 (Feb. 21, 1793).
82. See id.
83. 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2012).
84. See 5 Stat. 117, 123 (July 4, 1836); 35 U.S.C. § 135(a) (2006).
85. 35 U.S.C. § 135(a) (2006).
86. 37 C.F.R. § 41.127(a) (2009). This included claims that could have been brought into
the interference even if they were not. See Ex parte Kimura, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d 1537 (B.P.A.I.
2000).
87. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.127(a) (2009); see Ex parte Deckler, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1872
(B.P.A.I. 1991); Ex parte Tytgat, 225 U.S.P.Q. 907 (Bd. App. 1985); Charles L. Gholz, A
Critique of Recent Opinions of the Federal Circuit in Patent Interferences, 75 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 448, 475-76 (1993).
88. 37 C.F.R. § 41.127(b) (2009). Many parties tried to get out of interferences without
a judgment, but they all failed. See, e.g., Omura v. Shafer, 417 F. App’x 960 (Fed. Cir. 2011);
Guinn v. Kopf, 96 F.3d 1419 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Cameron, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d
1863 (B.P.A.I. 2001).
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the losing party from asserting or prosecuting claims that were patentably indistinct from—meaning, claims that would have been obvious
based on—the adjudged claims.89
Although, doctrinally, interference estoppel was severe, it had a relatively small effect simply because interferences themselves were rare.
In the last few years before the AIA was enacted, there were only about
50 to 60 interferences a year—amounting to approximately 0.01% of all
applications.90
2. Reexaminations were common, but parties could avoid estoppel
Until 1980, only federal courts could decide whether an issued patent was valid. In 1980, Congress created a radical new scheme by which
the Patent and Trademark Office could reexamine an issued patent,91 and
this ex parte reexamination exists to this day.92 The process is relatively
straightforward: a requester files a few papers in the beginning of the
proceeding challenging an issued patent, and then the reexamination
continues like a normal patent examination—ex parte.93 Thus, ex parte
reexamination proceedings “are very similar to regular examination procedures in patent applications” with the requester having no continuing
role.94 During ex parte reexamination, the patent owner can amend her
claims—sometimes cancelling some claims while adding other claims
that are “substantially identical”95—and, if the patent owner is dissatisfied with the examiner’s decision, she can appeal to the Board.96 Ultimately, if the Patent and Trademark Office determines that the claims
were unpatentable, the Office cancels the claims—and that cancellation
“extinguishes” any underlying district court suits asserting those
claims.97
In 1999, Congress added a new scheme for review: inter partes
reexamination (not to be confused with the inter partes review created

89. See In re Deckler, 977 F.2d 1449, 1452 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (citing cases).
90. See Legacy Format Statistics Archive, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/appealing-patent-decisions/statistics/ptabbpai-statistics-archive-page (last visited Dec. 17, 2019); see William Ahmann & Tenaya Rodewald, Patent Reform: The Impact on Start-ups, 24(1) INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J.
3, 4 (2012); Michael R. Hull, Patent Harmonization: Moving to A First-to-File Patent System,
46 LES NOUVELLES 58 (2011).
91. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 301, 302 (1982).
92. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 301, 302 (2012).
93. See 35 U.S.C. § 305 (2017).
94. MPEP § 2209.
95. See Target Training Int’l, Ltd. v. Extended Disc N. Am., Inc., 645 F. App’x 1018,
1023 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
96. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 134 (2017); see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 305, 306.
97. Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1336-37 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
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by the AIA).98 Anyone could file a request for inter partes reexamination.99 Inter partes reexaminations were more adversarial than ex parte
reexaminations, as the requester remained involved throughout and
could comment on every patent-owner response.100 Like ex parte reexamination, the patent would first go to an examiner for review, but, in
inter partes reexamination, either party could appeal to the Board from
an adverse decision.101 In 2011, Congress phased out inter partes reexaminations and replaced them with AIA trials.102 Ex parte reexaminations remain.
Importantly, neither ex parte nor inter partes reexaminations have
the severe estoppel provisions of interferences, 103 so the decision to undertake a reexamination proceeding does not inexorably lead to an estoppel-creating judgment.104 If a patent owner expects an adverse reexamination decision on one of her weaker patents—say the requester or
examiner puts forth strong arguments for rejection—the patent owner
can choose not to appeal or disclaim the involved claims, which would
allow her to avoid an estoppel-creating Board decision. The Patent and
Trademark Office will then issue a reexamination certificate of unpatentability or claim cancellation,105 but—even in that very reexamination—
the patent owner can obtain claims that are “substantially identical.”106
Thus, while the reexamination may cancel some claims—and extinguish
causes of action that rely on those specific claims—the reexamination
does not itself create estoppel for other claims.
3. Declaratory Judgments create estoppel, but they can be
avoided
A party can force non-asserted patents into district court litigation
by seeking a declaratory judgment.107 Declaratory judgments have res
judicata effects.
98. See 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2000).
99. See id.
100. See id. § 314(a).
101. See id. §§ 134, 315.
102. See AIA, 125 Stat. at 285; see infra notes 106-08 and accompanying text (discussing
the three new kinds of trials allowing the PTO to reconsider issued patents).
103. The interference estoppel provision of 37 C.F.R. § 41.127 (2009) is in subpart D, and
the regulations provide that, “An inter partes reexamination proceeding is not a contested case
subject to subpart D.” 37 C.F.R. § 41.60 (2009).
104. See MPEP § 706.03(w).
105. See MPEP §§ 2288 (ex parte reexamination), 2688 (inter partes reexamination).
106. See Target Training, 645 F. App’x at 1023 (explaining that if the newly added claims
were found to be “ ‘ substantially identical,’ then dismissal of the original cause of action
would be inappropriate, as the original claims effectively would have survived reexamination”).
107. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201.
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The Achilles heel of declaratory judgment actions, though, is the
statutory (and constitutional108) requirement for an underlying “case of
actual controversy.”109 This requirement allows patent owners to avoid
declaratory judgment actions even more easily than reexaminations. The
“case of actual controversy” ceases to exist if the patent owner gives the
declaratory-judgment plaintiff a covenant not to sue;110 if the patent
owner “unequivocally disclaim[s] any intent to sue” the declaratoryjudgment plaintiff;111 or if the patent owner dedicates the challenged
claims to the public.112 In such cases, the case is closed with no decision
on the validity of the claims.
To be sure, if the patent owner grants one party a covenant not to
sue for specific claims, she cannot assert those claims against that party,
and if she dedicates the claims to the public, she cannot assert those
claims against anyone. However, if the patent owner has other patents
that are stronger, then losing the weaker claims may well be a price
worth paying to control the patent-litigation battleground, thus avoiding
the potential domino effect that can come from estoppel.
C. The AIA makes it much harder to avoid a final, estoppel-creating
decision
The AIA “represents the most substantial change to American patent law since the Patent Act of 1952” and maybe even since 1836.113
Among other things, the AIA introduced three new kinds of trials that
allow the Patent and Trademark Office to reconsider issued patents: inter
partes review (“IPR”),114 post-grant review (“PGR”),115 and coveredbusiness-method review (“CBM”).116 Like inter partes reexamination,
IPRs and PGRs are largely available to any party, and IPRs are available

108. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239-40 (1937).
109. 28 U.S.C. § 2201.
110. See generally Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85 (2013); see also Arris Grp.,
Inc. v. British Telecomm. PLC, 639 F.3d 1368, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
111. Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto Co., 718 F.3d 1350, 1358, 136061 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
112. Nat’l Semiconductor Corp. v. Linear Tech. Corp., 703 F. Supp. 845, 850 (N.D. Cal.
1988).
113. N. Scott Pierce, The Effect of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act on Collaborative
Research, 94 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 133, 133-34 (2012).
114. 35 U.S.C. §§ 311-319.
115. Id. §§ 321-329.
116. AIA, § 18, 125 Stat. at 329-31. CBMs are sunsetting and will not be available after
September 15, 2020. See AIA, § 18(a)(3), 125 Stat. at 330.
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for any patent.117 (CBMs are more limited in scope.118) Like reexamination requesters, AIA petitioners do not have to show standing.119
However, an AIA trial is “more favorable to the challenger than the prior
reexamination process was.”120 As a result, there are far more petitions
for IPR than there were for reexamination, so more patents are being
invalidated in AIA trials than had been in reexamination.121 (Although
AIA trials have become somewhat more favorable to patent owners in
the last few years, they continue to be more popular—and to invalidate
more patents—than reexaminations.122)
One little-noticed difference between AIA trials and reexaminations concerns estoppel. The statute itself makes AIA estoppel somewhat broader than inter partes reexamination estoppel—both in terms of
timing and in terms of the estopped tribunals.123 But the implementing
regulations go significantly further because they give AIA trials the

117. Certainly, there are some limitations. Some petitioners are time-barred from seeking
IPR, no petitioner can petition for an IPR or PGR if they previously brought a district court
action challenging the patent, and only recently issued patents are susceptible to PGR. See 35
U.S.C. §§ 315, 321(c).
118. See AIA, § 18(a)(1)(B), (E), 125 Stat. at 330.
119. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2143–44 (2016).
120. See Robert Harkins, How the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) is Changing
Patent Protection and Litigation, INTELL. PROP. LAW, 2013 WL 571334, at *6 (Jan. 2013);
Gregory Dolin & Irina D. Manta, Taking Patents, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 719, 758-61
(2016).
121. In the 37 years in which ex parte reexamination have existed (since July 1, 1981),
patent owners lost some or all of their claims in 9,012 reexaminations for an average of just
under 250 per year. Ex parte Reexamination Historical Statistics, U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE 1-2 (Sept. 30, 2018), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ex_parte_historical_stats_roll_up.pdf. In the nearly 13 years in which inter partes reexamination could be requested (from November 29, 1999, to September 16, 2012), patent owners lost some or all of their claims in 1,369 reexaminations for an average of slightly over 100
per year. Inter Partes Reexamination Historical Statistics, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK
OFFICE 1 (Sept. 30, 2017), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/inter_parte_historical_stats_roll_up.pdf. Meanwhile, in the nearly 7 years in which AIA trials
have existed (since September 16, 2012), patent owners lost some or all their claims in 2,768
trials for an average of a little under 400 per year. Trial Statistics: IPR, PGR, CBM, U.S.
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE 10-11 (Dec. 2019), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Trial_Statistics_20191231.pdf. To be fair, those same documents show
that the raw percentage of decisions finding claims invalid are lower for AIA trials than reexaminations.
122. See Daniel F. Klodowski et al., IPR and CBM Statistics for Final Written Decisions
Issued in December 2019, AIA BLOG (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/blogs/america-invents-act/ipr-and-cbm-statistics-for-final-written-decisions-issued-indecember-2019.html; Daniel F. Klodowski et al., Special Report – PTAB IPR Stats Over Time
for Q2 2019, AIA BLOG (Aug. 13, 2019), https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/blogs/america-invents-act/special-report-ptab-ipr-stats-over-time-for-q2-2019.html.
123. See Matthew A. Smith, A Critical Analysis of the Inter Partes review statute, GRAY
ON CLAIMS 2-6 (Sept. 8, 2011), http://www.grayonclaims.com/storage/Critical_Analysis_of_Inter_Partes_Review.pdf.
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severe interference-estoppel provisions.124 Once a party petitions for inter partes review, the patent owner may not be able to avoid an estoppelcreating judgment because disclaimer and abandonment are treated as
requests for adverse judgment.125
As a result, even the claims of the patent owner that are not involved
in AIA proceedings become more subject to attack. Of course, unadjudicated claims can be challenged as obvious over the prior art directly
(just as they could be if there were no AIA trial). But, once a patent
owner has lost an AIA trial on some claims, the unadjudicated claims
can also be attacked through res judicata: “If the differences between the
unadjudicated patent claims and adjudicated patent claims do not materially alter the question of invalidity, collateral estoppel applies.”126 This
type of estoppel certainly applies—and has been applied—to other AIA
trials. In one case, the Federal Circuit found certain claims to be invalid
because they were patentably indistinct from claims in another patent
that had been invalidated in another IPR.127 In another, the court remanded to the Patent and Trademark Office to consider patentable distinctness over invalidated claims.128
Two district courts have also considered applying estoppel to district court litigation based on patents that had not actually been litigated
through.129 In both cases, the Patent and Trademark Office instituted an
IPR, the patent owner requested adverse judgment, and the patent owner
then asserted other claims from those patents in district court.130 The
district courts accepted that the patent owner could, theoretically, be estopped,131 although both courts found patentable distinctness between
the claims that were before the Patent and Trademark Office and the

124. Compare 37 C.F.R. § 41.127 (2009) (interference estoppel), with 37 C.F.R. § 42.73
(2020) (AIA estoppel); see supra note 103 (showing that interference-type estoppel did not
apply to reexamination).
125. 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b) (2020).
126. MaxLinear, Inc. v. CF CRESPE LLC, 880 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
127. See Papst Licensing GMBH & Co. KG v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 924 F.3d 1243,
1252-53 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
128. See MaxLinear, 880 F.3d at 1377.
129. See generally Music Choice v. Stingray Digital Grp., No. 2:16-cv-00586
(JRG)(RSP), 2019 WL 6114688 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 18, 2019), adopted 2019 WL 6052412 (E.D.
Tex. Nov. 15, 2019); Choon’s Design, LLC v. Zenacon, LLC, No. 2:13-CV-13568, 2015 WL
539441 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 9, 2015).
130. See Music Choice, 2019 WL 6114688, at *1; Choon’s Design, 2015 WL 539441, at
*3-4.
131. The district courts are right that res judicata should apply just as much to proceedings
in the Patent and Trademark Office as to district courts. In B & B Hardware, the Supreme
Court ruled that trademark decisions by the Patent and Trademark Office create res judicata,
and that seems legally indistinguishable from AIA trials. See B & B Hardware, 575 U.S. at
148-49, 160.
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claims at issue in the district court.132 Although the patent owner ultimately survived the res judicata motions, these situations illustrate the
risks that a patent owner faces when some patents in their portfolio are
challenged in the Patent and Trademark Office. The estoppel pitfall existed only because of the path dependence that the patent owner had
sought weaker claims, and those weaker claims were challenged. If the
patent owner had received only the stronger claims, they would not have
had estoppel problems.
However, a couple of years ago, in Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith &
Nephew, Inc., the Federal Circuit cast doubt on the Patent and Trademark
Office’s AIA-estoppel regulations.133 The case began when Smith &
Nephew petitioned for IPR of Arthrex’s patents.134 Before the Board
could decide whether to institute IPR, Arthrex disclaimed all its involved
claims while caveating that it was “not requesting an adverse judgment.”135 This caveat notwithstanding, Smith & Nephew argued that the
disclaimer legally served as a request for adverse judgment that would
trigger estoppel.136 The Board agreed. It ruled that it had discretion to
treat Arthrex’s statutory disclaimer as a request for adverse judgment
and that it was appropriate to do so in that case.137
Arthrex appealed the Board’s interpretation of the regulations to
the Federal Circuit, but it did not argue that the regulations were not authorized by statute.138 The majority, through Judge Dyk, found that the
Board had properly interpreted the regulations.139 However, the court
expressly “reserve[d] . . . for another day” the question of whether the
Patent and Trademark Office had authority to adopt the regulations.140
Judge O’Malley wrote a concurrence to express her “doubts about
whether the Director had the authority under 35 U.S.C. § 316 (or any
other statutory provision) to issue that regulation or whether, if so, the
regulation was properly promulgated.”141 She was unsure whether it
132. Music Choice, 2019 WL 6114688, at *2; Choon’s Design, 2015 WL 539441, at *9,
12, 14, 16, 18.
133. Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 880 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
134. Petition for IPR, Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Arthrex, Inc., No. IPR2016-00917
(P.T.A.B. Apr. 19, 2016) (Paper 2). at 1.
135. Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response at 1, Smith & Nephew, Inc., No. IPR201600917 (P.T.A.B. July 22, 2016) (Paper 8).
136. Petitioner’s Reply Brief at 1-2, Smith & Nephew, Inc., No. IPR2016-00917 (P.T.A.B.
Aug. 11, 2016) (Paper 10).
137. Judgment at 8, Smith & Nephew, Inc., No. IPR2016-00917 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 21, 2016)
(Paper 12).
138. Arthrex, 880 F.3d at 1349 & n.2.
139. See id. at 1349-51.
140. Id. at 1349; see id. at 1350 (“[B]ecause there has been no challenge to the Board’s
authority to adopt the rule, we sustain the Board’s reading of the regulation.”).
141. Id. at 1351 (O’Malley, J., concurring); see id. at 1351-52.
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would be appropriate for the Board to issue a final judgment even in an
instituted IPR after a disclaimer, but the Board’s decision to do so “prior
to institution” was “particularly” troubling.142 Judge Newman, meanwhile, dissented.143 She agreed that the Board lacked statutory authority
to issue an estoppel-creating judgment in the case, but she further believed that the regulations did not allow this either.144
The Federal Circuit’s doubts in Arthrex notwithstanding, the Board
continues to apply the regulations as written. Shortly after Arthrex, one
Board panel questioned whether adverse judgment is “even . . . allowed”
based on a pre-institution disclaimer.145 That panel, however, found that
there were other reasons to deny adverse judgment, so it avoided the issue.146 A more recent panel entered adverse judgment based on a preinstitution disclaimer—citing the Federal Circuit interpretation of the
regulations in Arthrex.147 In so doing, the Board pointed to the interference context as evidence of the scope of the estoppel.148
In summary, a defendant can target a patent owner’s weakest patents through AIA trials, and—if the petitioner receives a favorable judgment, either because the Board rules against the patent owner on the
merits or because the patent owner’s attempts to avoid the proceeding
are treated as a request for adverse judgment—the challenger can use
that judgment to infect the patent owner’s other patents.
IV. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S RECENT DECISION IN FOX FACTORY
MAKES IT HARDER FOR PATENT OWNERS TO RELY ON SECONDARY
CONSIDERATIONS IF THEY HAVE MULTIPLE PATENTS ON AN INVENTION
A bedrock of patent law is that an inventor is entitled to a patent
only for a non-obvious invention.149 While this fundamental principle is
easy to state, it is hard to apply. Courts cannot go back to the time when
the invention was developed and ask some hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art what that person would have done. Instead, lay
judges must decide, after the fact, what would have been obvious years
before. This potentially invites improper “hindsight” bias150 because
142. Id. at 1351, 1352.
143. Id. at 1352-56 (Newman, J., dissenting).
144. See Arthrex, Inc., 880 F.3d at 1352-56.
145. Commvault Sys., Inc. v. Realtime Data, LLC, No. CBM2017-00061, 2018 WL
1358433, at *1 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 14, 2018).
146. See id. (blaming the petitioner for delaying the request for adverse judgment).
147. See Google LLC v. Seven Networks, LLC, No. IPR2018-01118, 2019 WL 171672,
at *2 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 11, 2019).
148. See id. at *1.
149. 35 U.S.C. § 103.
150. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 36 (1966) (quoting Monroe Auto Equip. Co.
v. Heckethorn Mfg. & Supply Co., 332 F.2d 406, 412 (6th Cir. 1964)).
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“[m]any things may seem obvious after they have been made.”151 “[T]o
guard against slipping into use of hindsight,” courts look to what are
commonly known as “secondary considerations” or “objective indicia.”152 These factors include the “commercial success enjoyed by devices practicing the patented invention, industry praise for the patented
invention, copying by others, and the existence of a long-felt but unsatisfied need for the invention.”153 However, such secondary considerations are not always meaningful evidence of non-obviousness because
they may be due to “factors unrelated to patent validity.”154
For secondary considerations to be probative, they must have a
“nexus” to the patented invention.155 The burden is generally on the patent owner to produce evidence that shows that nexus exists,156 but nexus
is presumed if “the thing (product or method) that is commercially successful is the invention disclosed and claimed in the patent.”157
The law is more complicated in situations where a patent owner
holds multiple patents on the same or related inventions. A classic example of this type of complication arises with “blocking patents.” A
blocking patent is a patent that prevents others from trying to improve
on an existing invention.158 For example, if a drug company holds a
patent on the active ingredient in a drug, competitors have little incentive
to experiment with methods for delivering the drug since the blocking
patent will block them from monetizing any improvement in the delivery.159 Thus, any commercial success in a follow-on but blocked invention may be due less to the invention claimed in a later patent and more
151. Monroe, 332 F.2d at 412.
152. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 839 F.3d 1034, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (en banc)
(quoting Graham, 383 U.S. at 36).
153. Id.
154. Richard B. Robbins, Subtests of “Nonobviousness”: A Nontechnical Approach to
Patent Validity, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 1169, 1176-77 (1964) (cited in Graham, 383 U.S. at 18);
see also Consol. Safety Valve Co. v. Crosby Steam Gauge & Valve Co., 113 U.S. 157, 179
(1885).
155. E.g., Apple, 839 F.3d at 1054; In re Caveney, 386 F.2d 917, 923 (C.C.P.A. 1967);
see also CHISUM, supra note 14, § 5.05[2][f][i] at 5-1066-67 n.64 (citing numerous cases).
156. See, e.g., Demaco Corp. v. F. Von Langsdorff Licensing Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387, 1392
(Fed. Cir. 1988); Solder Removal Co. v. ITC, 582 F.2d 628, 637 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
157. Demaco, 851 F.2d at 1392.
158. See Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Roxane Labs., Inc., 903 F.3d 1310, 1337 (Fed. Cir.
2018) (“A patent has been called a ‘blocking patent’ where practice of a later invention would
infringe the earlier patent. The existing of such a blocking patent may deter non-owners and
non-licensees from investing the resources needed to make, develop, and market such a later,
‘blocked’ invention, because of the risk of infringement liability and associated monetary or
injunctive remedies.”).
159. See, e.g., Galderma Labs., L.P. v. Tolmar, Inc., 737 F.3d 731, 740 (Fed. Cir. 2013);
Allergan, Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 754 F.3d 952, 966 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharm.
USA, Inc. (Merck I), 395 F.3d 1364, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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to the existence of the blocking patent.160 Different panels of the Federal
Circuit seem to ascribe different weight to commercial success for a
product that has a blocking patent. Some describe it as of “minimal probative value,”161 but others say blocking patents “do not necessarily detract from evidence of commercial success of a product or process.”162
The problem of blocking patents is just one example of the more
general difficulty of assessing nexus for products covered by multiple
patents. Until recently, the Federal Circuit did not give clear guidance
on this question,163 but in Fox Factory Inc. v. SRAM, LLC164 the Federal
Circuit addressed the issue directly and held that having multiple patents
cuts against nexus. The case started with Fox Factory petitioning for
IPR of one of SRAM’s patents on bicycle chainrings.165 The Board
found that all of the claimed limitations were disclosed in two prior-art
references, and it also found that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the references. 166 Nevertheless, the Board upheld the
patent claims based on various secondary considerations.167
Fox Factory appealed, and the Federal Circuit remanded because it
concluded that there may not have been sufficient nexus.168 The court
explained that the claims were not “coextensive” with the commercial
chainrings.169 In support, the Federal Circuit noted that SRAM had a
continuation patent covering chainrings, and the chainrings that SRAM
sold undisputedly embodied an independent claim of that other patent.170
Because of that, the court held that no reasonable trier of fact could conclude that SRAM’s on-sale “chainrings are the invention claimed by the
independent claims” at issue.171 SRAM argued that it would be an “absurd situation that multiple continuations on a patent would prohibit a
presumption of nexus,” but the Federal Circuit ruled that the relationship
160. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc., 903 F.3d at 1337 (citing cases).
161. Galderma, 737 F.3d at 740-41 (quoting Merck I, 395 F.3d at 1376).
162. Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Hospira, Inc. (Merck II), 874 F.3d 724, 731 (Fed.
Cir. 2017); see Acorda, 903 F.3d at 1336-39 (discussing the various cases).
163. See generally CHISUM, supra note 14, at § 5.05[2][f] at 5-1073-77 (analyzing relevant cases). In Apple Inc. v. ITC, 725 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2013), for example, the
Federal Circuit noted that Samsung and the ITC argued that Apple could not show nexus
because “multiple patents cover the iPhone’s touchscreen,” but the court did not explain why
that argument was unpersuasive.
164. Fox Factory, Inc. v. SRAM, LLC, 944 F.3d 1366, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
165. Fox Factory, Inc. v. SRAM, LLC, No. IPR2017-00472, 2018 WL 1889561, at *1
(P.T.A.B. Apr. 18, 2018), vacated and remanded by Fox Factory, 944 F.3d 1366.
166. Id. at *5-7.
167. See id. at *13-20.
168. Fox Factory, 944 F.3d at 1380.
169. Id. at 1374-78.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1375.
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between the patents was irrelevant.172 Rather, the existence of “two patents” cuts against the presumption of nexus unless “both patents generally cover the same invention.”173
Fox Factory demonstrates a significant hazard of seeking multiple
patents on similar inventions. Obtaining multiple patents can make it
harder for the patent owner to show the required nexus between any secondary considerations of non-obviousness and the claimed invention.
V. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S RECENT CASE LAW ON OBVIOUSNESS-TYPE
DOUBLE PATENTING HAS MADE IT SO THAT OBTAINING ADDITIONAL
PATENTS CAN CAUSE A PATENT OWNER TO LOSE PATENT TERM

In his article Obviousness-Type Double Patenting: Why it Exists
and When It Applies, Daniel Kazhdan (one of the authors of this article)
shows that the Federal Circuit’s recent change to the law on obviousnesstype double patenting creates an additional pitfall for patent owners who
receive multiple patents on an invention. Now, a patent owner risks losing patent-term adjustment by getting more patents.174 In this section,
we summarize Kazhdan’s conclusions.
A. Patent term before and after the URAA
For more than two hundred years, a patent expired a particular number of years after it was issued: Patents issued between 1790 and 1835
were valid for 14 years from issuance; patents issued between 1836 and
1860 were valid for 21 years from issuance; and patents issued between
1861 and 1994 were valid for 17 years from issuance.175 In 1994, Congress passed the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (“URAA”).176 Under
the URAA, patents filed in 1995 or later expire 20 years from the patent’s effective filing date.177
This change in expiration dates created a potential problem. Under
the old scheme (where a patent’s term was set based on the date the patent issued), the patent owner would get the same number of years of
exclusivity no matter how long the Patent and Trademark Office took
examining the patent. By contrast, under the URAA scheme (where the
patent’s term is independent of the issue date), if the Patent and Trademark Office takes twenty years to examine a patent, the issued patent
172. Id. at 1377-78 (quoting SRAM’s brief; citations omitted).
173. Id. at 1377.
174. See generally Kazhdan, supra note 17.
175. Neel U. Sukhatme, Regulatory Monopoly and Differential Pricing in the Market for
Patents, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1855, 1895 n.146 (2014).
176. Pub. L. No. 103-465.
177. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (Supp. V 2017).
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might not have any valid term. Recognizing this potential problem, Congress required that patent term be adjusted to make up for examination
delays attributable to the Patent and Trademark Office.178 Thus, the patent owner would not lose patent term simply because a patent languished in examination. Patent-term adjustment is limited to the specific
patent whose examination was delayed, and related patents continue to
get their normal term.
An example may be helpful. Imagine an inventor applies for a patent on January 1, 2000, but the Patent and Trademark Office simply
does not look at her application until 2019. The Office only gets to issuing the application as the ‘000 patent on December 30, 2019. The term
of the ‘000 patent would get significant patent-term adjustment to account for the Patent and Trademark Office delay. Now, imagine that late
in 2019 the inventor files a continuation application that claimed the
same effective filing date as the ‘000 patent and that second application
promptly issues as the ‘001 patent on December 31, 2019. The ‘001 patent would not receive any patent-term adjustment, and it would expire
the very next day—20 years from its effective filing date. As a result,
these two related patents would expire on significantly different dates
despite claiming the same effective filing date.179
B. Obviousness-type double patenting and terminal disclaimers
Sometimes, having different expiration dates for similar patents is
problematic, and courts have developed the “obviousness-type double
patenting” doctrine as a means of limiting this type of situation. By way
of background, the doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting prohibits a patent owner from receiving two patents that claim patentably
indistinct inventions—generally defined as inventions that would be obvious over one another.180 A patent owner can get around an obviousness-type double patenting rejection by filing a “terminal disclaimer.”
In a terminal disclaimer, a patent owner disclaims the term of the challenged patent that would otherwise extend beyond the term of the reference patent—the patent that is being used as a challenge.181
Again, an example may help. The cleanest examples are preURAA,182 and we consider one of those. Imagine an inventor applies for
178. Id. at § 154(b).
179. This was not a URAA-created phenomenon. Indeed, before the URAA, related patents would always have different expiration dates if they did not issue on the same day—as
discussed at the conclusion of the next subsection. See infra Sec. IV(c).
180. See MPEP § 804(II)(B).
181. See MPEP § 1490(VI).
182. In re Fallaux, 564 F.3d 1313, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (explaining that obviousnesstype double patenting is of “limited force” after the URAA).
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a first patent on January 1, 1960, and then, on January 1, 1965, she files
a second application for a patentably indistinct invention. The Patent
and Trademark Office issues the first application as the ‘002 patent on
January 1, 1961, and the second as the ‘003 patent on January 1, 1966.
Without obviousness-type double patenting, both patents would expire
17 years from filing: the ‘002 patent would expire on January 1, 1978,
and the ‘003 patent would expire on January 1, 1983. The problem
would be that the applicant would get (and the public would lose) five
years of patent term based on the applicant’s filing for a second patent
that added little or nothing to the public’s knowledge. As a result, courts
would require the applicant to file a terminal disclaimer that disclaimed
the term of the ‘003 patent that extended beyond the January 1, 1978
expiration date of the ‘002 patent. In this way, both patents would expire
on January 1, 1978.
C. Obviousness-type double patenting after the URAA
Courts are still working out how obviousness-type double patenting
works post-URAA. In most cases, obviousness-type double patenting is
of “limited force” because two patents that claim similar inventions are
often related, which means that they will have the same effective filing
date, and, generally, the same expiration date.183 But not always. The
two patents might be unrelated (thus giving them different effective filing dates), one of the related patents might not claim the earliest possible
effective filing date, or one of the patents could have patent-term adjustment so that it is set to expire later than the related patent. Thus, obviousness-type double patenting lives on.184
What’s more, the doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting
may be expanding. Before the URAA, when a patent owner held two
patents on obvious variations of the same invention, the earlier-issued
patent could not be challenged for obviousness-type double patenting
based on the later-issued one—regardless of filing dates.185 However,
post-URAA, a later-filed, later-issued patent might shorten the term of
an earlier-filed, earlier-issued patent. This issue has yet to be finally
resolved by the courts, but, if true, it can be dangerous to file for continuation patents once an inventor has patent-term adjustment on a parent
because the child might shorten the term of the parent—what Kazhdan

183. Id. Terminal disclaimers also require common assignment, see 37 C.F.R.
§ 1,321(c)(3), but that is beyond the purview of this article.
184. Id. at 1318-19.
185. Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U.S. 186, 197 (1894).
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calls “patent patricide.”186 This depends on how one synthesizes four
relatively recent Federal Circuit cases.
1. Gilead Sciences, Inc. v. Natco Pharma Ltd.187
Gilead held two unrelated patents on its Tamiflu® drug product for
treating influenza.188 It applied for one patent on February 26, 1996, and
the Patent and Trademark Office issued that as the ‘375 patent on September 14, 1999.189 Gilead applied for the second patent on December
27, 1996, and that patent issued as the ‘483 patent on June 9, 1998.190
Thus, the ‘483 patent was an earlier-issued but later-expiring patent.

Figure 1: Gilead’s prosecution of its patents
Gilead sued Natco for infringing the later-expiring ‘483 patent.191
Natco responded that the ‘483 patent was invalid for obviousness-type
double patenting over the ‘375 patent.192 In a split decision, the Federal
Circuit agreed.193 The majority, through Judge Chen, ruled that obviousness-type double patenting was different after the URAA, and a laterissued but earlier-expiring patent could now serve as an obviousnesstype double patenting reference.194 Gilead presented an unusual fact scenario in that Gilead seems to have “crafted” two unrelated applications
to extend its patent term, but that gamesmanship does not seem to be the
basis of the court’s holding.195 Rather, the Gilead decision focuses
186. See Kazhdan, supra note 17.
187. 753 F.3d 1208 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
188. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 8-10, Gilead Scis. v. Natco Pharma Ltd., No.
14- (Nov. 26, 2014), available at https://www.pbwt.com/content/uploads/2016/09/Gilead-Petition-for-Writ-of-Certiorari.pdf.
189. Gilead, 753 F.3d at 1210.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1211.
192. Id.
193. See id. at 1217 (“an earlier-expiring patent can qualify as an obviousness-type double
patenting reference for a later-expiring patent under the circumstances”); see also id. (Radar
J. dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority’s expansion of “the judicially-created doctrine of
obviousness-type double patenting”).
194. See id. at 1214-17.
195. Id. at 1210.
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almost exclusively on the “expiration” dates of the patents—independent
of how that came to be.196 If that is right, then a patent owner’s continuation patents could always be a potential obviousness-type double patenting reference against their parents—even if the continuation was
filed later and issued later—and standard continuation patents could
cause patent owners to lose patent-term adjustment.197
2. AbbVie Inc. v. Mathilda & Terence Kennedy Inst. of
Rheumatology Trust198
Soon after Gilead, the Federal Circuit again analyzed obviousnesstype double patenting in the post-URAA context. The Kennedy Institute
held two related patents on a treatment for rheumatoid arthritis.199 The
Institute applied for the first patent, the ‘766 patent, in 1996, and it
claimed an effective filing date of 1992.200 Thus, the ‘766 patent was set
to expire 20 years from 1992, i.e., in 2012.201 In 2005, the Institute did
something unusual: it filed a continuation application, which issued as
the ‘442 patent, claiming a later effective filing date than its parent.202
Additionally, the ‘442 patent had 750 days of patent-term adjustment
and so was set to expire in 2018.203

196. See id. at 1214-17.
197. Cf. Gilead, 753 F.3d at 1218 (Radar J. dissenting) (“With this change, successive
continuations generally do not result in any additional patent term. Rather, the filing date of
the earliest member of a patent family limits the rest of the related patents. Thus a primary
motivation behind the doctrine—preventing the effective extension of patent term—is largely
no longer applicable.” (internal citations omitted)).
198. 764 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
199. Id. at 1368.
200. Id. at 1369.
201. Id.
202. See id. at 1370 (explaining that “[t]he ‘442 patent application was filed on September
12, 2005, and claimed priority to the date of the ‘766 patent was filed: August 1, 1996”).
203. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees, AbbVie Inc. v. Mathilda & Terence Kennedy Inst. of
Rheumatology Trust, No. 2013-1545, 2014 WL 808969, at *15 (Feb. 18, 2014).
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Figure 2: The Institute’s prosecution of its patents
AbbVie took a license to the earlier-issued ‘766 patent, but, when
the ‘442 patent issued, AbbVie refused to pay for a second license and
sought a declaratory judgment that the ‘442 patent was invalid for obviousness-type double patenting.204 The Federal Circuit agreed with
AbbVie that the later patent was invalid for obviousness-type double patenting.205 (Here, because the ‘442 patent issued later than the ‘766 patent, the obviousness-type double patenting problem would have existed
even before the URAA.) Again, the Federal Circuit focused on the problem of a “later expiring patent.”206 Although AbbVie involved a somewhat unusual fact pattern where the related applications claimed different effective filing dates, the Court suggested in dicta that there would
be an obviousness-type double patenting problem even in the more typical situation in which two patents have different expiration dates “due
to examination delays” that lead to “patent term adjustments.”207 That
seems to be referring to standard parent/child continuation practice
where the parent has patent-term adjustment and the child does not.208
Like Gilead, the Federal Circuit’s opinion in AbbVie suggests that a parent’s patent-term adjustment can be lost based on obviousness-type double patenting over a standard continuation.
However, in two later cases, the Federal Circuit seemed to backtrack.
204. AbbVie, 764 F.3d at 1370.
205. Id. at 1381 (“In sum, we conclude that the ‘442 patent is invalid for obviousness-type
double patenting in light of the ‘766 patent.”).
206. See id. at 1373-74, 80-81.
207. See id. at 1373.
208. See Stephanie Plamondon Bair, Adjustments, Extensions, Disclaimers, and Continuations: When Do Patent Term Adjustments Make Sense?, 41 CAP. U. L. REV. 445, 467-68
(2013).
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3. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. Breckenridge
Pharmaceutical Inc.209
Novartis owned two patents covering the drug Zortress®: the earlier-filed, earlier-issued, pre-URAA ‘772 patent and the related, laterfiled, later-issued, post-URAA ‘990 patent.210 Because of the URAA’s
change to patent terms, the earlier-filed, earlier-issued ‘772 patent was
set to expire later.211

Figure 3: Novartis’s prosecution of its Zortress® patents
The Federal Circuit, through Judge Chen, ruled that the later-filed,
later-issued ‘990 patent could not serve as an obviousness-type double
patenting reference against the ‘772 patent.212 The panel distinguished
AbbVie and Judge Chen’s own prior Gilead decision on two grounds.
First, Novartis’s patents involved the “particular situation” of one preand one post-URAA patent.213 Second, Novartis did not engage in the
“gamesmanship” of Gilead and AbbVie—where the patent owners
claimed different effective filing dates for similar inventions.214
The choice of the justification for distinguishing Breckenridge from
both Gilead and AbbVie has significant ramifications for a standard continuation patent. The first rationale assumes that a patent can be challenged based on a later-filed, later-issued, earlier-expiring patent. It just
carves out a small exception for the now (25 years after the URAA) rare
situation where there is a mix of pre- and post-URAA patents. By
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

909 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
See id. at 1358-59.
Id. at 1359.
Id. at 1359, 1367.
Id. at 1366.
Id. at 1364.
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contrast, the second rationale turns Gilead and AbbVie into exceptions
to a broader rule: the default under Breckenridge is that later-issued patents cannot serve as an obviousness-type double patenting reference,
with an exception for cases of gamesmanship.215
4. Novartis AG v. Ezra Ventures LLC.216
Ezra involves the concept of patent term extension.217 For our purposes, suffice it to note that Ezra is like Breckenridge in that it, too, distinguishes Gilead and AbbVie as cases of “gamesmanship.”218
As Kazhdan notes, there is tension in the case law.219 Gilead and
AbbVie suggest that filing continuation patents can now affirmatively
hurt previously granted patent-term adjustment, while Breckenridge and
Ezra seem to back away from this.220 As a result, patent owners now
potentially risk losing patent-term adjustment on parent patents if they
obtain continuation patents.
VI. OTHER WAYS IN WHICH RECEIVING ADDITIONAL PATENTS CAN
HURT A PORTFOLIO

Although this article focuses on recent changes in the law, there are
ways in which obtaining more patents has always had the potential to
hurt a patent owner’s portfolio.
A. Inequitable conduct in prosecuting one patent can infect another
patent
Patent applicants have an “uncompromising duty” to disclose to the
Patent and Trademark Office any “facts concerning possible fraud or inequitableness” in a patent.221 This duty requires that applicants act with
the “highest degree of candor and good faith.”222 From 1790 to 1836,
the Patent Act even included a provision that allowed a defendant to
move to have a patent repealed if the defendant could show that the patent was obtained “surreptitiously . . . or upon false suggestion.”223
215. Kazhdan, supra note 17.
216. 909 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
217. Id. at 1369.
218. Id. at 1374.
219. See Kazhdan, supra note 17.
220. See id. (analyzing how the rationales provided by the various decisions suggest different approaches to obviousness-type double patenting).
221. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 818 (1945).
222. Kingsland v. Dorsey, 338 U.S. 318, 319 (1949).
223. Patent Act of 1790, Ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109, 111 § 5 (Apr. 10, 1790); see also Patent Act
of 1793, Ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318, 322 § 6 (Feb. 21, 1793); S. William Cochran, Historical Review
of Fraud in Patent Procurement: The Standards and Procedures for Doing Business before
the Patent and Trademark Office, 52 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 71, 73 (1970).
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However, Congress removed that provision in 1836, and, for a time, the
Supreme Court believed inequitable conduct was no longer a valid defense to a suit for patent infringement.224 However, in a series of cases
from the 1930s and 1940s, the Supreme Court changed course and allowed defendants to raise an equitable defense of unclean hands.225
A finding of inequitable conduct has “far-reaching consequences”226: a patent applicant’s unclean hands in obtaining one patent
can render other patents unenforceable.227 Courts have therefore tried to
cabin the doctrine.228 Defendants need to plead inequitable conduct with
particularity,229 inequitable conduct requires that the patent applicant act
with the “specific intent” to deceive the Patent and Trademark Office,230
and, generally, the inequitable conduct has to be a but-for cause for the
patent’s issuance (unless there is “affirmative egregious misconduct”).231 The result is that inequitable-conduct defenses are almost
never successful.232
As relevant here, if a patent applicant commits inequitable conduct
while prosecuting a continuation patent, there is a theoretical possibility
that she will retroactively hurt her other patents. However, the Federal
Circuit has suggested that an applicant’s actions in prosecuting a continuation patent should not infect an already issued patent (at least not

224. Providence Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 76 U.S. 788, 797 (1869).
225. See, e.g., Precision Instrument, 324 U.S. at 814-15; Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 250-51 (1944); Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co.,
290 U.S. 240, 247 (1933); see also Cochran, supra note 223, at 74.
226. Therasense v. Becton, Dickinson, and Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
227. See Consol. Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco Int’l Ltd., 910 F.2d 804, 809-10 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (analyzing Keystone, 290 U.S. at 245-46; Precision, 324 U.S. at 816, 819); see also
Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1287 (“Inequitable conduct . . . diverged from the doctrine of unclean
hands by adopting a different and more potent remedy—unenforceability of the entire patent
rather than mere dismissal of the instant suit.”).
228. See, e.g., Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290 (“This court now tightens the standards for
finding both intent and materiality in order to redirect [the inequitable conduct] doctrine that
has been overused to the detriment of the public.”).
229. Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing
Ferguson Beauregard/Logic Controls v. Mega Sys., LLC, 350 F.3d 1327, 1344 (Fed. Cir.
2003)).
230. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290.
231. Id. at 1292.
232. See Jason Rantanen, Recalibrating Our Empirical Understanding of Inequitable
Conduct, 3 IP THEORY 98, 110-11 (2013) (explaining that, prior to Therasense, determinations of inequitable conduct “were uncommon,” but since Therasense they have become “even
more infrequent”); see also Robert D. Swanson, The Exergen and Therasense Effects, 66
STAN. L. REV. 695, 724 (2014) (finding that, since Exergen and Therasense, “the prevalence
of inequitable conduct claims has decreased from 17% to 8% of patent cases” and attributing
this drop to “a decrease [from 23% to 9%] in accused infringers’ success in proving inequitable conduct when an ultimate determination is made”).
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normally);233 and one district court has concluded that, as a matter of
law, “an otherwise validly issued patent cannot be made unenforceable
because of inequitable conduct occurring years later in connection with
the issuance of other patents.”234
B. Prosecution laches can infect a whole patent family
Somewhat related to inequitable conduct is the equitable doctrine
of prosecution laches.235 The Supreme Court has described the doctrine
as follows:
Any practice by the inventor and applicant for a patent through
which he deliberately and without excuse postpones beyond the date
of the actual invention, the beginning of the term of his monopoly,
and thus puts off the free public enjoyment of the useful invention,
is an evasion of the statute and defeats its benevolent aim.236

The purpose of the doctrine is to discourage applicants from delaying the issuance of patents until the public adopts the claimed technology.237 Like inequitable conduct, prosecution laches looks to “all of a
series of related patents”—and not just the patent at issue238—and, if
prosecution laches is found to invalidate a patent, related patents can be
rendered invalid too.239 Thus, this is another way in which continuation
applications can potentially hurt their already issued parents.
That said, prosecution laches is invoked only rarely.240 And now
that patent term is measured from the date the applicant files an application rather than the date the patent issues, an applicant’s incentive to

233. See, e.g., SSIH Equip. S.A. v. ITC, 718 F.2d 365, 378-79 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (finding
that the enforceability of the patent was unaffected where the fraud was not committed on the
Commission itself).
234. Duhn Oil Tool, Inc. v. Cooper Cameron Corp., 609 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1101 (E.D.
Cal. 2009); see generally Patrick N. Burkhart, The Sins of the Father Visited upon the Sons of
Another: Infectious Unenforceability and Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco International Ltd., 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 631 (1992).
235. See Robert A. Migliorini, Lessons for Avoiding Inequitable Conduct and Prosecution
Laches in Patent Prosecution and Litigation, 46 IDEA 221, 234-35 (2006).
236. Woodbridge v. United States, 263 U.S. 50, 56 (1923); see also Webster Elec. Co. v.
Splitdorf Elec. Co., 264 U.S. 463, 465-66 (1924).
237. Lemley & Moore, supra note 31, at 79-80 (discussing the process of “submarine
patenting”).
238. See Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., Educ. & Research Found.¸422 F.3d 1378,
1386 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
239. Id. at 1385-86 (explaining the need to holistically evaluate conduct, because delay
viewed “singly” may not merit relief, but “examination of the totality of the circumstances,
including the prosecution history of all of a series of related patents and overall delay” might).
240. Lemley & Moore, supra note 31, at 93 (As of the 2004 publication date, “only one
district court has held that the prosecution laches defense ought to apply, and in that case, the
delays in prosecution were as long as thirty-nine years.”).
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delay during prosecution is dramatically lower.241 Thus, the number of
cases invalidating patents for prosecution laches, which was historically
already small, is likely to get even smaller.
C. Statements made in one patent can affect claim construction and
create prosecution history estoppel for other patents within the family
When a tribunal is determining whether a patent claim is valid or
infringed, it sometimes must construe the meaning of a term that is used
in the claim.242 Many sources inform the meaning of each term, including other words in the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history of the patent or application at issue.243 The hope is to construe the
term in a way that is consistent with every claim, the specification, and
the prosecution history.244
Even aside from a claim term’s technical “meaning,” an applicant’s
statements during prosecution can estop her from making certain arguments. Specifically, there is an equitable doctrine of equivalents that
allows a patent owner to sue a defendant for infringing a patent even if
he does not literally practice every element recited in the claims so long
as the differences from the claim are only “insubstantial.”245 Determining the scope of equivalents can be complicated, but the applicant’s
statements during the prosecution of an application are an important factor. Under the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel, a patent owner
cannot “regain[] through litigation[] coverage of subject matter relinquished during prosecution of the application for the patent.”246 So, if
an applicant overcame a prior-art reference by narrowing an element in
a claim and the claim then issued, the patent owner generally cannot assert that a product that literally infringes the broader claims but does not
literally infringe the amended claims is legally equivalent.
In analyzing claim construction and prosecution history estoppel,
courts look to more than just the patent at issue. Statements the applicant
makes in a related specification or prosecution history—be it a child,
241. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 154(a)(2), 154(b), 156 (1999); S. Rep. No. 105-42, at 52 (1997)
(discussing damage caused by submariners because of earlier lack of deadlines).
242. See generally Steven C. Carlson, Peter S. Menell, & Matthew D. Powers, Patent
Claim Construction: A Modern Synthesis and Structured Framework, 25 BERKELEY TECH .
L.J. 713 (2010).
243. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
244. Southwall Technologies, Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1579 (Fed. Cir.
1995); Rheox, Inc. v. Entact, Inc., 276 F.3d 1319, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
245. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 24 (1997) (quoting
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950)).
246. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 734 (2002)
(quoting Wang Labs., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Elecs. Am., Inc., 103 F.3d 1571, 1577-78 (Fed. Cir.
1997)).
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parent, or sibling (i.e., an application that shares a common parent)—are
all potentially relevant.247 Indeed, even abandoned applications can limit
the scope of their non-abandoned relatives.248 In effect, anything the applicant has said during the prosecution of the related applications is fair
game in interpreting a claim term. Thus, applicants who file multiple
related patent applications run the risk of saying something that will later
undercut the scope of their already issued claims.
This means that applicants who receive a solid and far-reaching patent should be careful in prosecuting related applications so that they do
not accidentally limit the construction of their already issued claims or
the scope of the equivalents for those claims. With care, though, the
patent owner can avoid this problem.
VII. CONCLUSION
The upshot of this article is simple. The danger to the public of
having too many patents is well recognized.249 What has gone unnoticed
is that getting too many patents can hurt the patent owner herself. Although having multiple patents should, generally, give a patent owner
broader coverage, there have always been dangers to seeking additional
patents, and recent law has introduced significantly more risks. It has
long been the case that inequitable conduct or undue delay (leading to
laches) in prosecuting a later patent could infect an earlier-filed patent
that would, otherwise, be fine. It has also long been the case that statements an inventor later makes in applying for another patent can limit
the inventor’s claim coverage under the doctrine of equivalents.
Recent changes to the law have dramatically increased the risk. A
weak patent can make an easy target for an AIA trial—it is hard for a
patent owner to get out of those—and that trial can then infect stronger,
247. Biovail Corp. Intern. v. Andrx Pharm., Inc., 239 F.3d 1297, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(“Claim language . . . must be read consistently with the totality of the patent’s applicable
prosecution history.”); Cordis Corp. v. Boston Sci. Corp., 658 F.3d 1347, 1356 n.5 (Fed. Cir.
2011); Paice LLC v. Ford Motor Co., 881 F.3d 894, 902-04 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (looking to sibling patents to determine meaning of a term); Weber Elec. Co. v. E.H. Freeman Elec. Co., 256
U.S. 668, 676-79 (1921) (Supreme Court’s looking to statements a patent owner made in a
later patent to find a disclaimer of subject matter in an earlier one); but cf. Georgia-Pacific
Corp. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 195 F.3d 1322, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (rejecting infringer’s argument that a statement made in the prosecution history of a later patent application surrendering
claim coverage in that case, which was made after the patent in suit issued, applied to limit
the scope of the term in the patent at issue where the specification and prosecution history of
the patent at issue were unambiguous as to the meaning of the term), opinion amended on
reh’g, 204 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
248. E.g., Hakim v. Cannon Avent Grp., PLC, 479 F.3d 1313, 1317-18 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
249. See generally Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent
Pools, and Standard-Setting, in INNOVATION POLICY & ECONOMY (Adam Jaffe et al. eds.,
2001), available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/thicket.pdf.
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already issued patents. Additionally, recent case law has made it so that
a later-filed patent can weaken a patentee’s ability to show that her earlier-issued claims are valid through secondary considerations. Finally,
the Federal Circuit’s case law on post-URAA obviousness-type double
patenting might mean that a later-issued patent can cut short an earlierissued patent’s patent-term adjustment. In sum, caveat inventor.

